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Abstract   Taxing pure rents is usually considered the least distortionary method for
raising revenues. In the literature on fishery economics, the term “rent” is regularly
employed, suggesting that pure rents exist in that sector. Indeed, with the recent
development of individual transferable quotas, the resulting market value of quota
has been treated as reflecting pure resource rents. In this paper, the view that the
market value of quota represents a pure rent that can be readily extracted in a
nondistortionary manner by the taxing authority is challenged because that
argument ignores both economic incentives and political realities.
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Introduction
One of the most frequently mentioned regulatory devices in the fishery economics
literature is the use of a corrective tax to reduce the amount of fishing effort. Start-
ing with an open access setting, the tax converts a situation of rent dissipation into
one of rent capture. Despite its seemingly apparent potential for improving condi-
tions, the use of a corrective tax to regulate a fishery has not fared well in the politi-
cal arena.1 Recent development of individual transferable quota (ITQ) fisheries,
however, has rekindled interest in the idea of imposing special taxes on that sector.2
But in contrast to the efficiency-enhancing aspects of a corrective tax under open
access conditions, the main objective of taxation under an ITQ system is the transfer
of wealth from owners of quota to the government. Moreover, arguments supporting
special taxation are predicated on the false notion that the market value of quota
represents a pure economic rent that can be readily captured by the taxing authority.
Under an ITQ system, holders of quotas have a legally defined right to catch a
specified quantity and type of fish. Although there is only a handful of ITQ fisheries
in existence today, that institution is considered one of the best for correcting the
problems of overcapitalization and overfishing so prevalent in open access fisheries.
When individual fishers have an explicit right to the harvest, they have an enhanced
stake in the fishery and are in a better position to benefit from future improvements
The author thanks Mike Arbuckle and Phil Neher for comments on an earlier draft.
1 The lack of real world examples of the use of Pigouvian taxes to regulate the fishery, or other forms of
externalities for that matter, is well recognized in the literature. See, for example, Scott (1979, p. 735),
Johnson and Libecap (1982, p. 1,014), and Clark (1990, p. 255).
2 For a discussion of the development of ITQ systems in various countries, see the articles in the volume
edited by Neher, Arnason, and Mollett (1989). Different methods of taxing rents in an ITQ fishery are
discussed in Grafton (1992 and 1995).Johnson 328
in its health. Although fishers themselves have a clear incentive to develop an ITQ
system on their own, they have been thwarted in that endeavor by high contracting
costs and legal prohibitions against collective action (Johnson and Libecap 1982).
Accordingly, the role of implementing an ITQ system has fallen largely to govern-
ment. The case of New Zealand is illustrative.
On October 1, 1986, New Zealand introduced an ITQ system for most of its
fisheries to alleviate problems of overcapitalization and overfishing (Clark, Major,
and Mollett 1989). Quotas were allocated on the basis of catch history, followed by
a period of quota buybacks and prorated cuts to achieve a sustainable total allowable
catch (TAC) and enhance the economic value of the fishery. By most measures, the
New Zealand experience would have to be deemed a success. The current market
value of quota is close to one billion dollars, which far exceeds the direct costs in-
curred by the government in establishing the ITQ system.3 The creation of wealth,
however, has attracted the attention of the New Zealand Treasury, who early on
viewed the ITQ system as a revenue source:
Given that ITQs are the leasehold right to harvest the nation’s fishery re-
sources, the Crown (as lessor) should charge a resource rental to ITQ holders
(lessees) which ultimately appropriates the entire super-profit earned by fishers
as a result of being able to harvest the nation’s fishing resources, as reflected
by the market value of quota.4
This statement reflects a misunderstanding about the different sources of economic
rents in the fishery. It also conveys the impression that pure rents in the fishery can
be readily captured by a resource rental charge. This view is not restricted to the
New Zealand Treasury. In their description of the ITQ system, Clark, Major, and
Mollett (1989, p. 138) state that “one consequence of the ITQ management system is
the generation of economic rent, which can either be taxed away by the government
or left in the fishery to be capitalized into the value of the ITQ.” Although currently
the level of resource rentals are substantially less than the annual lease value of
quota, the idea that the government has both the right and ability to extract all of the
rents in the fishery has its political supporters.5
In this paper, the view that a resource rental charge constitutes a pure wealth
transfer is challenged. It is argued that a tax on quota value differs from a theoreti-
cally neutral tax on net returns, or an ideally set corrective tax. In particular, a tax
on quota value will alter the industry’s preferred TAC, shifting it back toward the
open access level. The potential for the industry to use the political arena to influ-
ence the choice of an allowable harvest is an obvious factor. In New Zealand, for
example, the industry has been granted a voice in negotiations with the government
over the appropriate TAC. Nevertheless, the ability of the industry to influence the
determination of the TAC is ignored in standard models of the fishery. For example,
Grafton (1992 and 1995) compares various methods of extracting rents in an ITQ
3 The figure was supplied by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington, New Zealand. It is
based on a survey of quota brokers taken during 1992.
4 New Zealand Treasury, Treasury Report No. 4498, October, 1985, Appendix 1, p. 2. Although the use
of quota values for determining resource rentals has not gone unchallenged (see Linder, Campbell, and
Bevin 1992), recent amendments to The New Zealand Fisheries Act of 1983 (F Act of 1983, 107G(7), as
amended by s.55(2)(a) FA Act 1990), requires that the market value of ITQs be used in determining re-
source rentals.
5 In a media release dated March 2, 1994, the Office of the Minister of Fisheries, Wellington, New
Zealand, announced that the term “resource rentals” would no longer be used. The tax has been rela-
beled an “access fee.” In principle, there has been no change, as the fee, if adopted, will be based on
quota value. This fee is in addition to charges that will be levied on the industry to recover the
government’s cost of managing the commercial fishery.Taxing Quota Value 329
fishery: quota rental charges, a pure profit charge, lump sum charges payable by
each vessel, and a royalty charge based on output price. In his analysis, an omnipo-
tent regulator sets the TAC to maximize aggregate rents in the fishery and holds it
there as taxes are imposed. But as shown in this paper, imposition of a resource
rental charge will cause fishers to lobby for a change in the TAC. In turn, this can
affect not only the choice of method of taxation, but it also raises the question as to
whether the resource should be subject to any special taxation.
Although the discussion offered in this paper will draw on the experience of
New Zealand, it is not intended to be a full description of events in that country.
Rather, the New Zealand experience provides a backdrop for discussing the issue of
resource rentals in general. The first section of this paper commences with a brief
discussion of economic rents in a natural resource setting. It is then demonstrated
that when factor rents besides those associated with the fishery resource exist, re-
source rentals can impact optimal stock levels and harvest rates. In the second sec-
tion of this paper, the impact of resource rentals on enforcement costs, incentives for
collective behavior, and inventive activity are discussed.
Economic Rents, Resource Rentals, and Optimal Stock Levels
Economic Rents
Economic rent is commonly regarded as a payment to the owner of a resource where the
availability of the resource is insensitive to the payment received.6 In the standard sup-
ply and demand diagram, the supply curve would be a vertical line, invariant to price.
Should a tax be imposed on the market value of the resource, supply would be unaf-
fected, suggesting that taxation causes no deadweight loss. The concept of optimal taxa-
tion emphasizes the efficiency aspects of various taxes.7 Within that framework, a sector
of the economy thought to contain economic rents would be more heavily taxed.
The term “rent” is regularly employed in the literature on natural resource eco-
nomics. In models of optimal resource use, the objective of the resource manager
frequently is maximization of rents. Yet few natural resources conform to the com-
mon definition of rent given in the opening sentence of this section. David Ricardo
(1821, p. 33), for example, referred to rent as the payment for the “uses of the origi-
nal and indestructible powers of the soil.” In retrospect, it seems strange to refer to
soil as indestructible. It can be depleted or overused, depending upon the incentives
facing the user. Once it is recognized that the supply of a natural resource is not an
indestructible flow, it no longer follows that a system of optimal taxation implies
higher taxes on the natural resource sector.8 Indeed, the timing of extraction or
method of harvesting a natural resource may be highly sensitive to taxation.9
Moreover, there are factors of production other than natural resources where the
supply function is not perfectly elastic. An example of such a factor could be special
6 The concepts of economic rent used in this paper are based on those described by Alchian (1987).
7 An enormous amount of information on actual tax incidence is required to make the concept of an opti-
mal tax system operational. Despite the obvious lack of this information, it is nonetheless a popular con-
cept among tax policy debaters. See the discussion of optimal tax systems by Slemrod (1990).
8 Diamond and Mirrless (1971) and others have shown that in the absence of pure rents in the economy,
production efficiency requires that there be no differential factor taxes, or even taxes on intermediate
goods for that matter.
9 There is also a well-developed literature that examines the impact of taxes on extraction rates and time
paths of both renewable and nonrenewable resources. With the exception of some ideally set tax on net
returns, deviations in resource use will result. For a survey of the literature showing how taxes can alter
extraction profiles and harvest rates, see Heaps and Helliwell (1985).Johnson 330
managerial talent that is important only to the particular industry under scrutiny. As-
suming this heterogeneity occurs naturally, and it is too costly to reproduce its spe-
cial distinguishing features, the long run supply function for that factor will be up-
ward sloping. Accordingly, payment to the inframarginal units will exceed their op-
portunity cost. For the purposes of this paper, this net return to a factor of produc-
tion will be referred to as a rent.10
The Impact of Resource Rentals
Now consider the traditional model of the fishery. There, it is commonly asserted
that under open access conditions, entry will occur to the point where economic
rents are zero.11 Supposedly, this problem can be corrected and rents maximized by
restricting entry, either by issuing explicit property rights or through regulations. As
mentioned in the opening remarks, one form of regulation that is frequently dis-
cussed in the literature is the use of a corrective tax to reduce the amount of fishing
effort. Fishing effort is usually denoted as a function of the capital and labor inputs
used to harvest fish. The objective of corrective taxation is to reduce the amount of
redundant effort and allow the fish population time to recover. If the tax rate is set
correctly, either on fishing effort or on the harvest itself, the implicit rental value of
the fishery resource will be maximized.12 The tax can achieve this objective, in part,
because it alters the equilibrium stock level of the fish population. The important
point here is that the imposition of the tax actually generates the very rent that is
subsequently collected by the taxing authority. Under a system of corrective taxa-
tion, property rights—either in the form of limited entry or ITQs—usually are as-
sumed not to have been established. Hence, under this scenario, the government or
taxing authority is the implicit owner of the resource. On the surface, this would ap-
pear to be an attractive outcome—at least if economic efficiency is the criterion. In
the classic example, taxation causes no deadweight loss as there is actually a net
gain to the economy in the form of tax revenues. Indeed, if the fishery had other sig-
nificant value, such as in contributing to the genetic pool, the tax could have addi-
tional benefits by reducing the probability of extinction.
But corrective taxes have not been the regulatory instrument of choice. One ob-
vious reason is that taxation does not benefit fishers, and they have political clout in
lobbying against taxation. Within the context of the standard fishery model, the tax
will induce the exit of boats and crews from the fishery. If these factors were highly
mobile, the adjustment process would be relatively smooth. However, boats and
crews are often highly specialized, and the tax will bite into quasi-rents. But special-
ization is not restricted to the short run. In contrast to the implications of the stan-
dard model, rents can be positive in the fishery even under open access conditions.
Individuals engaged in the fishery often talk about skippers, vessels, and crews
whose performance is exceptional year after year.13 Some of the observed differ-
10 As Alchian (1987, p. 142) points out, these net returns are often referred to as “Ricardian Rents.” In
addition, Alchian explains that there are also “differential rents” which reflect “premia to units that are
the same value here but different in their best use values.” Regardless, the factor supply function, or
Alchian’s RR function, will be upward sloping, implying the existence of factor rents.
11 See, for example, Hartwick and Olewiler (1986, pp. 243–68); Tietenberg (1992, p. 313); and Kahn
(1995, p. 277). If pressed, I suspect most of these authors would agree that inframarginal rents exist.
Nevertheless, it is this simple model of complete rent dissipation under open access conditions that the
taxing authorities seem to have in mind.
12 A tax on landings would most likely be less costly to administer than a tax on effort.
13 The existence of crews who are substantially more productive than others even when using similar
equipment is often noted in the literature. See, for example, Scott (1979, p. 733). For empirical support,
see Johnson and Libecap (1982) and Finnell (1995).Taxing Quota Value 331
ences can be attributed to innate skills that are not readily transferable to other in-
dustries (Johnson and Libecap 1982). The potential for rents in the fishing industry,
however, extends beyond the harvesting sector. Special managerial talent in the process-
ing sector also is a potential source of rents that depend on the existence of the fishery.
Heterogeneity in skills or talent implies that the long run supply curve for factor inputs,
including those associated with the processing sector, is upward sloping. A tax or royalty
on the harvest will not only have a negative impact on quasi-rents, but can reduce the
returns to special talent. Thus opposition to taxation can persist even in the long run.
Now, instead of a corrective tax, consider the assignment of ITQs. The purpose
of the ITQ is to limit entry and increase the rents generated in the fishery. Of course,
allocating ITQs is the same as distributing wealth, so disagreement and conflict can
be expected. But once the assignment process has been completed, the ITQs provide
a means for managing the fishery. If those engaged in the fishery were to maximize
aggregate net returns under the ITQ system, the optimal harvest rate would seem-
ingly be the same as that selected under the corrective tax scheme. Given that the
two systems for regulating a fishery yield the same outcome, at least theoretically, it
is tempting to conclude that the taxing authority could proceed to tax away the mar-
ket value of quota without altering resource use. If correct, a tax on quota value
would be neutral, causing no distortions in the primary market.
To better analyze the conditions wherein a tax on quota value may or may not
be neutral, a dynamic, but fairly standard, model of the fishery will be used.14 The bio-
logical aspects of the fishery can be captured by the ordinary differential equation
dx
dt
Fx ht = () – ( ) . (1)
Here, x = x(t) is the size of the fish population at time t and F(x) is a function repre-
senting the natural growth rate of the fish population. The function, F(x), is assumed
to be twice differentiable with a maximum value, commonly referred to as the maxi-
mum sustainable yield.15 The harvest is denoted h(t) and is assumed to be a function
of a catchability factor, q(x), and fishing effort, denoted E,
h  =  q(x)E. (2)
Since catchability is enhanced when the stock is large, the first and second partial
derivatives of q(x) are assumed positive and negative, respectively,
q′ (x) > 0, and q′′ (x) < 0. (3)
Here, effort is a composite measure, a function of labor and capital inputs used in
harvesting and processing fish. Following convention, the inputs are expressed in
constant quality units and the exponent of E has been set equal to unity, implying
that effort is produced under constant returns to scale. Thus, if there are rents associ-
ated with any of the inputs subsumed in the effort function, they will be reflected
via factor price effects.
In New Zealand, the fishery is relatively small compared to the world market,
so that the price of processed fish, P, can be taken as a parameter. Denote the oppor-
tunity cost of effort as C(E), where C′  is the marginal cost of effort. Accordingly, C′
traces the supply curve for effort, and the area underneath the C′  function measures
14 For a full description of this model and variants of it, see Clark (1990).
15 The intent here is that the function, F(x), reflect the standard Schaefer model. See Clark (1990, p. 15).Johnson 332
the opportunity cost of effort. Note that if C′′  is positive, there will be an explicit
factor price effect, implying that rents are positive even under open access conditions.
Now, assume that the ITQ system is already in existence, and allow the harvest-
ers, processors, and quota owners to be one and the same. This is consistent with the
situation in New Zealand, where much of the industry is vertically integrated.16 Ac-
cordingly, assume that their collective objective is the maximization of aggregate
rents, which include the value of quota. Here, the quota represents a right to a share
of the total harvest. This arrangement is similar to one that currently prevails in New
Zealand. Since 1990, an ITQ has represented a tonnage-denominated entitlement
that varies with changes in the TAC. The key institutional ingredient in this model
that differs from standard assumptions is that the TAC is assumed to be determined
collectively by the industry, not the taxing authority. In New Zealand, the TAC is
determined annually by the Minister of Fisheries in consultation with industry repre-
sentatives.17 Absent taxes on quota value, and assuming that the industry has suffi-
cient political influence in the TAC determination process, the current-value Hamil-
tonian for this problem is
   H =+ [] Pq x E C E u F x q x E () – () () – () . (4)
Given the above assumptions, the Hamiltonian is strictly concave. The maximum
and adjoint equations are
   H E = ′ = Pq x C uq x () – – () 0 (5)
and
   H x Pq E uF uq E ru u = ′ + ′′ = –– ˙. (6)
In this constrained optimization problem, the costate or adjoint variable, u, measures
the marginal value of the fish stock. Under an ITQ system, u would, in this particu-
lar case, also measure the per unit value of quota, the periodic or lease value of
quota. Rewriting equation (5) reveals that the output price minus the marginal cost









In equation (6), r is the rate of interest and  ˙ u is the time derivative, du/dt. The focus








16 In 1993, the quota holdings of the top four firms in the industry accounted for about 42% of total
quota holdings, while the top thirty firms had approximately 82% (New Zealand Fishing Industry Board,
1993, Appendix 4). These firms are engaged in both harvesting and processing of fish.
17 New Zealand Fisheries Act of 1983, F Act 1983, section 13.
18 Since the production function is h(t) = q(x)E, the marginal product of effort is simply q(x). Marginal
factor cost is equal to C′ . It follows from the basic theory of the firm that dividing the marginal factor
cost by that factor’s marginal product yields the cost of producing an additional unit of the output
(Hirshleifer and Glazer 1992, p. 288).Taxing Quota Value 333














Since F′  is the slope, dF/dx, of the natural growth function, an increase in F′  implies
a reduction in the stock of fish. Accordingly, if the rate of interest were to increase,
F′  would increase, implying a reduction in the steady state stock level. However, re-
ductions in the level of stock also increase the marginal cost of harvesting. Since the
sign of the second term in equation (9) is negative, F′  could be positive, negative, or
zero. That is, the optimal rate of harvest could require that the corresponding opti-
mal stock level be greater than, less than, or equal to the level that would maximize
sustainable yield. Selecting the optimal harvest rate implies making a trade-off be-
tween the gross returns to harvesting and a reduction in harvesting costs. Once the
optimal harvest rate is selected, the quota right will become an explicit harvest right.
In the absence of any tax on quota value, and given competition and transferability, the
market or lease value of a quota right will equal the marginal value of the resource
stock, u in equation (7). In equilibrium, all fishers will have the same marginal cost of
harvesting, and each will value the right to harvest an additional quantity of fish at u.
Now consider the imposition of a tax of t, 0 < t ≤  1, on the aggregate rents asso-
ciated with the fishery. The Hamiltonian for this problem is
   H = [] + [] (–) () – () () –(). 1 tP q x E C E u F x q x E (10)
The maximum and adjoint equations are
   H E tP q x C u q x = ′ []= (–) () – – () 10 (11)
and
   H x t Pq E uF uq E ru u = ′ + ′′ = (–) – – ˙. 1 (12)
As was done above, equations (11) and (12) can be used to solve for F′ . Once that is
done, it is a straightforward exercise to show that the same result reported in equa-
tion (9) will be obtained. That is, the term (1 – t) will cancel out, implying that the
imposition of this type of tax will not affect the choice of the optimal harvest rate.
This result demonstrates the standard policy recommendation so prevalent in the lit-
erature on natural resources: tax net returns so as not to distort extraction profiles.19
But to effectively tax in this nondistortionary manner requires that the taxing author-
ity know both the output price and marginal cost of production. While information
on price is likely obtainable, it is unlikely they would have sufficient information on
the cost of harvesting. Once an ITQ system is implemented, however, the taxing au-
thority may obtain information on the market value of quota.20 Moreover, it is con-
19 See, for example, Heaps and Helliwell (1985, pp. 428).
20 The information content of quota prices and how they can aid fishery managers is discussed by
Arnason (1989). However, an explicit assumption in Arnason’s paper is that the total value of ITQs re-
flects all of the rents in the fishery. That is, the long run supply schedule for effort is assumed horizon-
tal. Hence, fishery managers seeking to maximize the net benefits of the fishery have a market deter-
mined measure, quota value, to aim for. The importance of that assumption is demonstrated in the text.Johnson 334
ceivable that the taxing authority would view the lease value of quota as a correct
measure of rents being earned in the fishing industry. Indeed, as noted in the intro-
duction to this paper, the New Zealand Treasury appears to adhere to that view. But
if taxed on the basis of the lease value of quota, fishers will have an incentive to
alter their behavior and, in doing so, alter the market value of quota.
As before, it will be assumed that there is a competitive and active lease market
for quota, with some quota owners electing to lease part or all of their quota. The
lease market provides the data used by the tax authority to value quota. To further
simplify, assume that the tax or resource rental is imposed on the owner of quota,
not the lessee.21 Given this tax incidence, the maximum value a lessee will place on
the right to harvest an additional unit is the difference between the output price and
marginal cost, p – C′ /q(x). Assuming competition in the quota market, this will be
the observable lease price. Accordingly, quota owners will pay t[p – C′ /q(x)] to the
taxing authority and net (1 – t)[p – C′ /q(x)]. The total lease value of all quota is sim-
ply [p – C′ /q(x)] multiplied by the total harvest, q(x)E. When a tax of t is imposed






 + [] Pq x E C E t P
C
q
qxE uFx qxE ( ) – ( )– – ( ) ( )– ( ) . (13)
The maximum equation is
   H E t Pq x C tC E uq x = ′ [] + ′′ = (–) () – – () . 10 (14)
Inspection of the above equation reveals that u no longer equals the lease value of
quota, p – C′ /q(x), when the lease value is taxed. As t increases, u declines, indicat-
ing that the implicit value of the stock has declined. This decline will induce the in-
dustry to lower the steady state stock level. The adjunct equation is
   H x t Pq E uF uq E ru u = ′ + ′′ = (–) – – ˙. 1 (15)


















A comparison of equation (16) with equation (9) reveals that a tax on the lease
value of quota can have a different impact on resource use than a tax on net re-
turns.22 In equation (16), allow the tax rate to approach unity. As t approaches unity,
the denominator of the third term in equation (16) approaches infinity, leaving the
first two terms of the equation to determine F′ . Both of those terms are positive, im-
plying that the fishing industry will desire a reduction in the stock level compared to
the no-tax scenario. Although a tax on quota value reduces the net returns to the
21 This is a simplifying assumption, as the tax could be placed on the lessee with the same qualitative results.
22 This result contrasts with Grafton’s (1992, p. 502) claim that “it is notable that both a quota and a
profit tax can capture the total rent in the fishery at the long-run equilibrium.” In a later paper, Grafton
(1995, p. 58) acknowledges that a pure profit tax would be relatively costly to implement.Taxing Quota Value 335
fishing industry, the key to understanding the incentives facing the industry is the
existence of a factor price effect, C′′  > 0. If C′′  were equal to zero, equation (16)
would be identical to equation (9), and a tax on quota value would be equivalent to a
tax on net returns. When C′′  is positive, however, the supply curve for effort is up-
ward sloping, and rents in addition to those captured by quota value are being
earned. When the returns to quota ownership are confiscated by the tax, there is an
incentive to shift the relative use of stock and effort in such a way that the net re-
turns to effort increase. Because rents are earned on factors of production other than
the stock, the tax induces the industry to emphasize those other factors of produc-
tion. Indeed, the industry may actually lobby for a return to open access conditions.
The outcome will depend, in part, on whether the initial stock level was to the right
or left of the maximum sustainable yield level. Nevertheless, these results show that
the taxation of quota value does not yield a neutral outcome when there are other
factors of production whose supply to the industry is not perfectly elastic. Of course,
in deriving this result it is asserted that the industry is capable of influencing the de-
termination of the TAC.
There are different political systems in this world, but if the analysis is re-
stricted to representative democracies, elected officials should be acknowledged as
key players. While the motives of elected officials may vary and are not always con-
spicuous, they most commonly seek reelection. That entails tending to constituent
interests and overseeing the behavior of regulatory agencies. Although the notion
that regulatory agencies are “captured” by the industry they are supposed to regulate
is extreme, elected officials are clearly cognizant of constituent groups who can either
help or harm their chances for reelection.23 To better serve their constituents, elected of-
ficials will commonly seek membership on committees most closely aligned with the
welfare of their constituents (Fiorina 1989). Membership on these committees al-
lows elected officials a direct say in the design of regulatory policy. While the day-
to-day operation of the agency is often left to bureaucrats, the electoral process as-
sures that the groups most affected will have a say in how the agency operates.24
Compared to the limited scope and narrowly defined constituency of most regu-
latory agencies, national treasury departments are more closely identified with the
broader constituency and policy issues of the chief executive: the president or prime
minister. While not absent from the pressures of parochial interests, treasury depart-
ments are relatively immune from them, at least in a direct sense. Given their man-
date, they may seek to raise revenues in what they perceive to be the least costly
way. In response, elected officials can be expected to rally around their affected con-
stituencies. Even if these representatives fail to ward off a tax increase, they likely
will be sympathetic to efforts by their constituency to reduce its impact. This behav-
ior underlies the result shown in equation (16). The tax on quota, imposed by one
agency, alters the preferred stock level as seen by the industry, who in turn lobbies
the agency controlling the TAC to make adjustments.
There is another point worth noting. If the government has the knowledge to set
23 When aiding a constituency, elected officials will seldom act as perfect brokers. Instead, they trade off
the support of the various competing groups. See Peltzman (1976).
24 In much of the fisheries literature, the agency in charge of managing the fishery is treated like a black
box. It is devoid of checks and balances, but for some unspecified reason has the clear objective of
maximizing net social returns. That approach ignores the electoral process and constituent interest. It
also ignores the desire bureaucrats have to satisfy their own objectives, and these can differ from those
of elected officials. Indeed, they may be even more sympathetic to the plight of the industry than elected
officials if they view the industry as a potential future employer. The amount of leeway they have to act
in a discretionary manner will vary across governmental forms, but they are often in a position to influ-
ence outcomes. Reasons why bureaucrats have been allowed discretionary power are discussed in
Johnson and Libecap (1994).Johnson 336
the optimal TAC and the political muscle to extract substantial rents in the fishery,
then it is hard to see why an ITQ system would be their regulatory choice. Armed
with both knowledge and mission, the government seemingly would be in a position
to adopt and implement an optimal tax. In practice, however, precise data on most
fish populations are seldom available, and the industry itself must be relied upon to
provide information on effort as well as figures on the harvest. Absent cost data, the
government may resort to experimenting with different TACs to maximize tax rev-
enues. But as shown in the above model of the fishery, as long as other sources of rents
exist, maximizing tax revenues will not maximize aggregate rents. By going through the
process of establishing an ITQ system, the government has demonstrated that either
it does not have the political will to impose an optimal corrective tax, or it lacks the
information to do so. Although it is likely that both factors pertain, it should be clear
that taxing the market value of quota can destroy information needed by the govern-
ment, as the industry will find ways to adjust stock levels and hence, quota values.
As a consequence, a tax on quota value should not be considered a neutral tax.
Given the above results, it is no doubt tempting to think of other forms of taxa-
tion that would yield a neutral outcome. Taxes based on the value of landed fish are
often advocated as a method for regulating an open-access fishery. But if imposed
on an existing ITQ fishery where quota holders have a say in determining the TAC,
the landings tax will be nonneutral. Again, consider equation (9). Imposing a land-
ings tax amounts to reducing P. But a reduction in P will induce the quota holders to
act collectively to alter harvest levels. Of course, there remains the prospect of im-
posing a lump sum tax on each vessel in the fishery, or some other factor. But if that
factor is alterable, as is the number of vessels, a lump sum tax will cause a distortion
because there will be an incentive to reduce use of the factor that is being taxed.
Such fees will be discussed further in the concluding remarks.25 In the following
section, additional reasons for the nonneutrality of resource rentals are given.
Enforcement, Investment, and Collective Action
A nagging problem for any fishery management system is enforcement. Under an
ITQ system, cheating can occur in a variety of ways. Fishers may fail to report their
harvest, or misreport its weight. When a report is filed, they may attempt to report
the species taken as some other species with a lower quota value. Or the catch may
be reported as having been made in a legal fishing area when, in fact, it was ob-
tained elsewhere. Another persistent problem for the regulator is by-catch. In a
multispecies fishery, species other than those being legitimately targeted will occa-
sionally be caught. Knowing when this by-catch, harvested in excess of quota, was
taken incidentally in the process of catching the targeted species is difficult. Al-
though fishers under an ITQ system have an incentive to engage in self policing, the
large numbers of fishers and the difficulty of detecting poachers leaves the system
vulnerable (Scott 1989, p. 29). Since it is very costly to monitor most fishing activ-
ity, the probability of detecting violators is substantially less than unity. In this envi-
ronment, heavy fines and penalties can deter cheating (Sutinen and Andersen 1985).
Under New Zealand law, not only are fines imposed upon conviction of quota
management offenses, but the law explicitly calls for the forfeiture of quota except
in extenuating circumstances.26 The value of quota forfeited can readily exceed the
amount collected in fines and loss of equipment, which also may be confiscated. If
25 Auctioning off the rights to the fishery is also a frequently mentioned alternative. But like the correc-
tive tax scheme, it too faces high political costs.
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the government elected to tax quota value, the possibility of forfeiting quota could
lose much of its deterrent effect, forcing the government to place more reliance on
fines. Since in the absence of an ITQ system most fishers are not noted for their
wealth, fines would not be a perfect substitute for forfeiture of quota. If the prob-
lems of enforcement become substantial, stock levels could once again be affected.
Resource rentals can also have a negative impact on the incentives facing mem-
bers of the industry to invest in cost-reducing activities. A decrease in the cost of
effort shifts the supply function to the right, thus increasing the rental value of the
fishery. If the market value of quota is being fully taxed away, however, the reduc-
tion in harvesting costs may not benefit fishers. What matters is how the cost func-
tion shifts. If there were no resource rentals, a reduction in costs would unambigu-
ously increase the industry’s aggregate returns to inventive activity.
There are certainly exceptions to the above implication. Where patents can be
perfected, the returns to inventive activity will largely be reflected in the price of the
cost-reducing device rather than in the value of quota. In that case, the supply func-
tion for effort may not shift, or shift less than it would if the right to use the device
were made freely available. Even in the absence of patents, returns to inventive ac-
tivity can be positive. Since fishers are heterogeneous, those who are quick to adopt
the device can earn inframarginal returns in the short run, and these returns may be
sufficient to attract resources into the processes of discovery and development. But
in the absence of resource rentals, the ITQ system offers a rather unique way of cap-
turing returns to inventive activity.
Although on balance the patent system encourages inventive activity, it is far
from a perfect protector of ideas (Cheung 1982). Consider a fisher who invests time
and other resources to uncover new methods for harvesting fish. Even if the end re-
sult is patentable, costly litigation may be required to prevent others from imitating
it. Moreover, to capture returns under the patent system, use of the cost-reducing
idea is restricted (Arrow 1962). In contrast, if the fisher owns or can purchase quota,
positive returns to discovery are available through the appreciation of quota value as
the idea proliferates and finds it way into common usage.27 As a consequence, there
is a potential efficiency consideration that favors the use of appreciation in quota
value compared to the patent system. If returns come in the form of quota apprecia-
tion, widespread usage is beneficial to the innovator and the industry. Additionally,
in the absence of resource rentals, the ITQ system provides incentives for the indus-
try to act collectively to lower costs and engage in activities such as product devel-
opment and fishery management that have the potential to increase quota value.
One of the great promises of the ITQ system is its potential for galvanizing col-
lective action. By restricting entry, the ITQ system eliminates at least one important
obstacle to contracting. Because the identities of the participants are known, organi-
zational costs are lower than in an open access setting. Bargaining is also facilitated
because quota owners have a value in common, namely quota value. Unlike agricul-
tural land, where most of the decisions of the landowner can be thought of as being
internalized, fishers rely on the same common fish stock. Hence, even under an ITQ
system, margins for the dissipation of rents remain. For example, since the fish
stock enters the cost function of each fisher, there is an incentive to harvest early in
the season when stocks are higher. Because spillover effects remain, there is a need
for collective action when undertaking fishery management and enhancement pro-
grams. Since the introduction of an ITQ system in New Zealand, associations of
27 The potential for ITQs to act as an inducement to inventive activity is also noted by Anderson (1989,
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quota holders have begun to develop. These associations have sought and obtained
agreements to restrict harvests, spread the catch out over time, and redefine manage-
ment areas in a more operational manner so that investments can be undertaken.28
The substantial increase in resource rentals that some in the government are request-
ing threatens these associations, as the increase would reduce the incentives of fish-
ers to engage in collective action.
Concluding Remarks
Throughout much of the world, privatization is being touted as a means to raise liv-
ing standards. But governments also appear to view these newly-formed entities as
part of an enlarged tax base. Privatization of the fishery, for example, has fostered
the argument that the value of quota can and should be taxed away by the govern-
ment. This policy has been predicated on the grounds that the government owns the
resource and is entitled to the rents generated by the fishery, and that resource rent-
als merely capture pure rents. The arguments presented in this paper challenge the
notion that taxing rents in an ITQ fishery amounts to a pure transfer, devoid of dead-
weight losses. Closer examination reveals numerous margins for adjustment to re-
source rentals. Although the issue of whether the government does in fact own the
fishery is not addressed in this paper, it is not clear the government has the ability to
maximize aggregate rents. As a consequence, tax revenues may actually be higher if
resource rentals are not imposed.
Under an ITQ system, and in the absence of resource rentals, the fishing indus-
try has an incentive to maximize aggregate rents, not just the value of quota. The
greater these rents, the higher are revenues from taxes on firms’ profits and indi-
viduals’ incomes. These revenues can exceed the returns from resource rentals. As
argued in this paper, imposition of resource rentals will cause the industry to seek
harvest rates that do not maximize aggregate rents in the fishery, thus lowering the
tax base. Moreover, even if the resource rental is not set to extract the total lease
value of quota, the government will still be in a position similar to that of a landlord
under a share tenant arrangement. Since the industry will have less incentive to de-
velop the fishery, the government will be in a quandary, having to decide where and
how to invest in the fishery in order to increase net rents. Although the government
may claim ownership of the resource, the task of harvesting under an ITQ system is
left to others whose behavior should not be assumed to remain unchanged by re-
source rentals.
While the arguments presented in this paper are intended to illustrate the ad-
verse effects of resource rentals, it should not be inferred that the fishing industry
ought to be exempt from special levies. Experience has revealed that an ITQ system
can be costly to the government, both in terms of implementing the initial property
rights, and in enforcing those rights once they are established. User fees aimed at
recovering the government’s legitimate costs of defining and policing an ITQ sys-
tem not only seem equitable, but the fees would serve as a check on whether the sys-
tem is worth maintaining. In order to provide a check of the benefits and costs of an
ITQ, the fees, unlike resource rentals, should not be linked to quota values. Instead,
lump sum fees should be charged to quota owners based on the percentage or share
of the TAC they hold.
28 For example, in 1993, fishers holding orange roughy quota in one of the fishery management areas
established their own company to help monitor and enforce collectively agreed upon restrictions. Access
to certain areas was limited and the timing of harvest was spread out.Taxing Quota Value 339
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